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Which rates should we use to discount costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent nature
at diﬀerent time horizons? We answer this question by considering a rep-
resentative agent consuming two goods whose availability evolves over time
in a stochastic way. We extend the Ramsey rule by taking into account
the degree of substitutability between the two goods and of the uncertainty
surrounding the economic and environmental growths. The rate at which en-
vironmental impacts should be discounted is in general diﬀerent from the one
at which monetary beneﬁts should be discounted. We provide arguments in
favor of an ecological discount rate smaller than the economic discount rate.
In particular, we show that, under certainty and Cobb-Douglas preferences,
the diﬀerence between the economic and the ecological discount rates equals
the diﬀerence between the economic and the ecological growth rates. We
also justify a decreasing term structure of the ecological discount rate on
the basis of the large parametric uncertainty aﬀecting the evolution of the
environmental quality.
Keywords: Discounting, Ramsey rule, bivariate utility function, precau-
tionary premium, sustainable development.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G12, E43, Q511I n t r o d u c t i o n
How much eﬀort should we exert to improve the environmental quality that
we will leave to future generations? This is a central question for a wide
set of environmental contexts, as global warming, nuclear wastes, or biodi-
versity. Its answer depends upon our expectations about the quality of the
environment and about the level of economic development that these future
generations will face. For example, it is intuitive that our optimal eﬀort
should be relatively large if we believe that the environment will be much
deteriorated in the future or/and if the economy will be ruined. The problem
is made complex because of the considerable uncertainties that we face with
respect to both the ecological and the economic evolutions of our societies.
There are two possible methods to evaluate the present monetary value
of a sure future environmental impact. The classical one consists in ﬁrst mea-
suring the future monetary value of the impact, and second discounting this
monetary equivalent impact to the present. This involves a pricing formula
to value future changes in environmental quality, and an economic discount
rate to discount these monetarized impacts. The second approach would
consist in ﬁrst discounting the future environmental impact to transform it
into an immediate equivalent environmental impact, and then measuring the
monetary value of this immediate impact. This involves an ecological dis-
count rate, to discount environmental impacts. Of course, these two methods
are strictly equivalent. As shown by Hoel and Sterner (2007) in the case of
certainty, the two discount rates diﬀer if the monetary value of environmental
assets evolves over time.
The classical method is not well adapted to the case of uncertainty. In-
deed, the value of environmental assets in the future depends upon their
relative scarcity, which is unknown. This is a problem because the economic
discount rate is useful to discount sure future monetary beneﬁts. Because the
monetary value of environmental impacts is uncertain, one needs to compute
its certainty equivalent. This requires the use of a stochastic discount fac-
tor, which determines at the same time the risk premium and the economic
discount rate. Standard pricing formulas exist that can be borrowed from
the theory of ﬁnance, but there are seldom used in cost-beneﬁta n a l y s e so f
environmental projects because of their complexity. In this paper, we follow
the alternative methods based on the ecological discount rate. The ecologi-
cal discount factor associated to date t is the immediate sure environmental
1impact that has the same impact on intergenerational welfare than a unit
environmental impact at date t. The (shadow) price of an immediate envi-
ronmental impact can then be used to value environmental projects. This
alternative method is simpler because one does not need to compute certainty
equivalent future values.
The aim of this paper is to characterize the determinants of the economic
and the ecological discount rates. The eﬃcient economic (resp. ecological)
discount rate equals the marginal rate of substitution between future and
present consumption (resp. environmental qualities). Since Ramsey (1928),
we know that the socially eﬃcient economic discount rate is driven by an
economic growth eﬀect: if aggregate consumption is growing over time, and
if the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing, the marginal utility of
consumption is decreasing with time, yielding a positive economic discount
rate. A symmetric argument exists for the ecological discount rate: if the
quality of the environment improves with time, and if the marginal utility of
the quality of the environment is decreasing, this environmental growth eﬀect
justiﬁes a positive ecological discount rate. On the contrary, if one believes
that the quality of the environment will deteriorate over time, a negative
ecological discount rate may be socially eﬃcient. However, assuming that
consumption is a substitute to the quality of the environment, the economic
growth has a positive impact on the ecological discount rate, thereby poten-
tially counterbalacing the eﬀect of the deterioration of the environment. As
observed for example by Traeger (2007), the possibility to substitute the de-
teriorating environment quality by othe rg o o d si sa tt h ec o r eo ft h en o t i o no f
sustainable development. If the substitutability is limited, the environmental
deterioration eﬀect dominates the economic growth eﬀect, and the ecological
discount rate should be small or negative, thereby inducing us to preserve
environmental assets.
Following Weitzman (2007) and Gollier (2002, 2007), we consider a consumption-
based theory of discount rates under uncertainty. Uncertainty adds three ele-
ments into the picture. Besides the growth eﬀects and the substitution eﬀect,
there is a precautionary eﬀect. The uncertainty associated to the future qual-
ity of the environment reduces the ecological rate if the marginal utility of the
environment is convex in it. This assumption is very intuitive, as shown by
the following thought experiment. Suppose that there are two equally-likely
states of nature, one in which the environmental quality is much larger than
in the other. Suppose that you must allocate to one of these two states an
2environmental lottery that would preserve the mean environmental quality
in the state in which this lottery is allocated. If the above mentioned as-
sumption holds, one must prefer to put the lottery on the better state. In the
terminology of Kimball (1993) and Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), a sure
loss and a zero-mean risk on environmental quality are mutually aggravating.
We also exhibit a cross-precautionary eﬀect. If the marginal utility of
the environment is convex in consumption, the uncertainty on the economic
growth has a negative impact on the ecological discount rate. This is be-
cause the substitution eﬀect (which raises the ecological rate) becomes less
reliable in this case. Following Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007), this
assumption on the preferences of the representative agent holds if a sure loss
on environmental quality and a zero-me a nr i s ki nc o n s u m p t i o na r em u t u a l l y
aggravating. Finally, there is a correlation eﬀect if the risks on economic
growth and on the evolution of the environment are statistically related. If
the marginal utility of the environment is supermodular, a positive correla-
tion between the two variables tends to reduce the two discount rates. This
is because this positive correlation tends to raise the aggregate future uncer-
tainty, thereby inducing the representative agent to make more eﬀort for the
future.
Our analysis exhibits two arguments in favor of using an ecological dis-
count rate smaller than the economic discount rate. Under certainty, we
show that the diﬀerence between the economic and the ecological discount
rates equals the diﬀerence between the economic and the ecological growth
rates. A ﬁrst argument is thus derived from the hypothesis that the growth
of environmental quality is smaller than the economic growth. A second ar-
gument is based on the hypothesis that there is more uncertainty about the
evolution of the environmental quality than on the evolution of the economy.
The precautionary argument, which tends to reduce the discount rate, is thus
stronger for the ecological discount rate.
An important question is to determine whether the ecological and the
economic discount rates should be sensitive to the time horizon. Weitz-
man (2007) and Gollier (2007) have justiﬁed a decreasing term structure of
t h ee c o n o m i cr a t eb a s e do nal e a r n i n ge ﬀect in a model in which there is
some parametric uncertainty aﬀecting the growth process. We show that a
similar result holds for the ecological discount rate in a model with a multi-
attribute utility function when the sensitiveness of the environmental quality
to changes in GDP per capita is uncertain. We believe that this argument is
3particularly relevant for the ecological discount rate, because of the consid-
erable parametric uncertainty underlying the evolution of the quality of the
environment.
2A m o d e l f o r e ﬃc i e n td i s c o u n tr a t e s
We consider a simple aggregate model with two goods. The ﬁrst one is an
aggregate consumption good, whereas the second one is an aggregate environ-
mental good. The latter can be seen as a quality index of the environment,
which includes the comfort generated from the climate, the services extracted
from the biodiversity, the morbidity due to various pollutions, or the life ex-
pectancy for example. The representative agent extracts felicity U(x1t,x 2t)
at date t by consuming x1t when the quality of the environment is x2t.W e
assume that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U : R2 → R is
three times diﬀerentiable.
At date t =0 , the representative agent evaluates actions by using the








where δ is an ethical parameter valuing future utils relative to current ones,
and where E is the expectation operator that takes into account the fact
that the pair (x1t,x 2t) is uncertain at date t =0 .1 T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea g e n t
contemplates the possibility to sacriﬁce some current utility either to increase
consumption at date t or to improve environmental quality at that date.
The ﬁrst problem refers to the choice of the economic discount rate, which
discounts future consumption. The second problem refers to the choice of the
ecological discount rate, which discounts future changes in the environmental
quality.
We ﬁrst examine the economic discount rate. Let us consider a simple
marginal project that would increase consumption by a sure amount ε in
period [t,t + ∆t], and that would reduce consumption by εe−r(t)t in period
[0,∆t], leaving the environment unaﬀected by the action. Observe that this
1In this paper, all expectations are taken conditional to the information available at
date 0.
4simple project has a sure internal rate of return r(t). Implementing this















In other words, the internal rate of return of the project must exceed a
minimum threshold, r1(t), to be socially eﬃcient. Thus, r1(t)d e ﬁned by
equation 2 is the socially eﬃcient economic discount rate associated to time
horizon t. It allows for the comparison of the value of diﬀerent consumption
increments at diﬀerent dates.
Consider alternatively an investment project that increases the environ-
mental quality by ε in period [t,t + ∆t]. The standard way to include this
environmental impact in the cost-beneﬁt analysis would be to ﬁrst express
this impact in future monetary terms. The instantaneous value vt of the en-
v i r o n m e n ta td a t et is measured by the marginal rate of substitution between










If the quality of the environment would be traded, vt would be its equilibrium
price, taking the aggregate consumption good as the numeraire. More gener-
ally, vt is the instantaneous willingness to pay for improving environmental
quality. Its evolution over time is uncertain, i.e., vt is a random variable seen
from t = 0. So is the future monetary beneﬁt εvt o ft h es u r ei m p r o v e m e n t





CEt i st h es u r ei n c r e a s ei nc o n s u m p t i o na td a t et that has the same eﬀect on
welfare than an ε increase in environmental quality at date t,s e e nf r o md a t e
0. It would be the equilibrium future price Pf of an asset traded at date
0 that delivers one unit of the environmental good with certainty at date t
5against the payment of Pf at that date. This certainty equivalent must then
be discounted at the economic discount rate r1(t) to measure the net present
monetary value of a sure future improvement of the environment.
A much simpler approach is obtained by deﬁning an ecological discount
rate. Consider a marginal project that would increase the environmental
quality by a sure amount ε in period [t,t + ∆t], and that would reduce the
environmental quality by εe−r(t)t in period [0,∆t]. Implementing this project
would be socially eﬃcient if







This equation deﬁne the ecological discount rate r2(t) associated to time
horizon t. It allows to compare sure changes in the environment quality at
diﬀerent dates. Namely, an increase in environmental quality by ε at date t
has the same eﬀe c to ni n t e r t e m p o r a lw e l f a r et h a na ni n c r e a s ei nc u r r e n te n v i -
ronmental quality by εe−r2(t)t. In monetary terms, this is equal to v0εe−r2(t)t.







To sum up, the beneﬁt of a unit increment in environmental quality at
date t should be accounted for in the evaluation of a project as equivalent
to an immediate increase in consumption by v0e−r2(t)t. This really means
that environmental costs and beneﬁts should be discounted at the ecological
rate r2(t), which needs not to be the same than the economic discount rate
r1(t). The potential discrepancy between the economic discount rate and the
ecological discount rate takes into account of the stochastic changes in the
relative social valuation of the environment.
Before examining the determinants of the ecological discount rate, let us
discuss a few assumptions on the successive derivatives of the utility function
that will be considered in this paper. First, we assume that U is increasing
and concave in its two arguments. In addition, consider a sure loss li in
variable i, i =1 ,2, a n daz e r o - m e a nr i s kεj in variable j, j =1 ,2. Notice
that a sure loss and a zero-mean risk are two ”harms” for risk-averse agents.
With Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006, 2007), we hereafter assume that the
representative agent always prefer to incur one of the two harms for certain,
6with the only uncertainty being about which one will be received, as opposed
to a 50-50 gamble of receiving the two harms simultaneously, or receiving
neither. Following a terminology introduced by Kimball (1993), this means
that pairs of harms are ”mutually aggravating”. As shown by Eeckhoudt
and Schlesinger (2007), this implies that Uij ≤ 0a n dUijk ≥ 0f o ra l li,j,k ∈
{1,2}. For example, U211 is positive if any zero-mean risk in consumption
and any sure loss in environmental quality are mutually aggravating:
((x1 + ε1,x 2),1/2;(x1,x 2 − l2),1/2) % ((x1,x 2),1/2;(x1 + ε1,x 2 − l2),1/2).
3 The determinants of the ecological discount
rate
We can approximate the eﬃcient ecological discount rate by performing a
second-order Taylor expansion of U2(x1t,x 2t)a r o u n d( x10,x 20)i ne q u a t i o n
(4). It yields an ”ecological Ramsey rule”:
















• Rij = Rij(x10,x 20)w h e r eRij(x1,x 2)=−xjUij(x1,x 2)/Ui(x1,x 2) > 0
is the elasticity of Ui to changes in xj. When i = j,t h i si st h er e l a t i v e
aversion to ﬂuctuations (or inequality aversion) in dimension i. R21
and R12 are measures of the degree of substitutability, or correlation
aversion.2
• Pijk = Pijk(x10,x 20)w h e r ePijk(x1,x 2)=−xkUijk(x1,x 2)/Uij(x1,x 2) >
0 is the elasticity of Uij to changes in xk. It is an index of prudence if
i = j = k or of cross-prudence otherwise;
• git =( Exit − xi0)/xi0t is the annualized expected growth rate of xi in
interval [0,t];
2Bommier (2005) discusses the notion of correlation aversion in the context of an in-
tertemporally non-separable utility function.
7• σijt = E(xit − xi0)(xjt − xj0)/xi0xj0t approximates the annualized co-
variance in (xit/xi0,x jt/xj0).
Beside the rate of pure preference for the present δ, the ecological discount
rate has 5 determinants that are described by the 5 remaining terms in the
right-hand side of equation (5). In the remainder of this section, we describe
these determinants.
• R22g2t: This determinant of the ecological discount rate is based on the
expectation about the evolution of the environmental good. Because
the marginal utility of the environment is decreasing, any ﬁrst-degree
stochastic dominant shift in the distribution of the environmental qual-
ity raises r2. For example, if we believe that the environment will
improve in the future, a positive ecological return is necessary to com-
pensate for the increased intergenerational environmental inequality
that the implementation of the project would yield. This environmen-
tal growth eﬀect is approximately equal to the product of the relative
aversion to intergenerational environmental inequality R22 by the av-
erage growth rate of the environmental good g2t.T h i s e ﬀect is sym-
metric to the well-known economic growth eﬀect in the Ramsey rule
r1 ' δ + R11g1t, where g1t is the average growth rate of consumption.
• −0.5R22P222σ22t :B yJ e n s e ni n e q u a l i t y ,i fU2 is convex in x2,a n y
Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) increase in risk on the future quality of the
environment reduces the ecological discount rate. This result is intu-
itive, as future risk should induce us to perform more eﬀort for this
future. This result is symmetric to the notion of precautionary sav-
ing in the economic sphere. This environmental precautionary eﬀect
takes the form of reducing the expected environmental growth g2t by
the ecological precautionary premium 0.5P222σ22t (see Kimball (1990)).
• R21g1t : Suppose that consumption and the environment are substi-
tutes, i.e., that U2 is decreasing in x1. Under this assumption, any
ﬁrst-degree stochastic dominant shift in future consumption raises the
ecological discount rate. The intuition of this e c o n o m i cg r o w t he ﬀect
is that one should care less about the future environment if future
generations will be able to compensate the environmental damages by
8their better economic development. This economic growth eﬀect is ap-
proximately equal to the product of the index R21 of substitutability
by the average growth rate g1t of consumption. When the degree of
substitutability is limited, the economic growth eﬀect is small, thereby
inducing more environmental preservation.
• −0.5R21P211σ11t : Symmetrically, if U2 is convex in x1, then any increase
in risk on x1t reduces the ecological discount rate. This is the economic
precautionary eﬀect, which reduces the expected economic growth g1t
by the economic precautionary premium 0.5P211σ11t.
• −R22P221σ12t :S u p p o s et h a tU2 be supermodular (U221 ≥ 0), which is
true if any zero-mean risk on environmental quality and any sure loss
in consumption are mutually aggravating. Suppose also that the eco-
logical risk and the economic risk are positively correlated. This would
increase the global risk and the willingness to improve the future en-
vironmental quality. This is the correlation eﬀect. In another context,
Gollier (2007) formalizes the link between the supermodularity of a bi-
variate function and the positive statistical relationship of its variables.
Suppose that an increase in x1t yields a ﬁrst-degree stochastic improve-
ment in the conditional distribution of x2t. Then it implies that, under
the supermodularity of U2,E U 2 is larger than if one would assume
(x1t,x 2t) to be independent with the same marginal distributions. This
increase in EU2 reduces the ecological discount rate.
A symmetric approximation can be derived for the economic discount
rate, where the indexes i =1a n di = 2 are exchanged. It yields















4 Cobb-Douglas utility and lognormal distri-
butions







9in the domain x1 > 0,x 2 > 0. The monotonicity of U with respect to x1 and
x2 requires that
sgn(1 − γ1)=sgn(1 − γ2)=sgn(k).
The concavity of U with respect to x1 and x2 implies that γ1 and γ2 must
be positive. Moreover, we obtain tha tt h er e l a t i v ea v e r s i o nt or i s ko nxi
(Rii) is a positive constant γi, whereas the relative correlation aversion R12
is a constant γ2 − 1. We also have that Piii =1+γi > 0, P221 = γ1 − 1,
and P211 = γ1. If we assume that γ1 and γ2 are both larger than unity,3
the representative agent considers pairs of harms as mutually aggravating,
implying correlation aversion (Rij > 0) and (cross-)prudence (Pijk > 0).
We consider three diﬀerent speciﬁcations for the dynamics of (x1t,x 2t).
In the ﬁrst one, we suppose that it follows a bivariate geometric Brownian
motion. It implies that for all t,( l nx1t,lnx2t) is jointly normally distributed
with mean (lnx10 + μ1t,lnx20 + μ2t) and variance-covariance matrix Σ =
(σijt)i,j=1,2. The proof of the following propositions are relegated to the
Appendix.




2 and that (x1t,x 2t) fol-

















where σij = t−1cov(xit,x jt) and gi = t−1 lnExit/xi0 = μi +0.5σii. Symmetri-
















These formulas extend the generalized Ramsey rule to an ecological econ-
omy. It shows that the approximations (5) and (6) are exact when the utility
function is Cobb-Douglas and (x1t,x 2t) are jointly lognormal. An important
implication of this proposition is that the term structures of the economic dis-
count rates and of the ecological discount rates are ﬂa t .I ns u c ha ne c o n o m y ,
3Solving the equity premium puzzle would require a relative risk aversion larger than
10. See also Dr` eze (1981), who suggests that relative risk aversion is around 4.
10the random evolution of aggregate consumption and of the environmental
quality does not justify to use a smaller rate to discount beneﬁts occurring
in a more distant future. Another immediate consequence of Proposition 1
is that
r1 − r2 =( g1 − g2)+( γ2σ22 − γ1σ11)+( γ1 − γ2)σ12. (10)
Interestingly enough, under certainty, the diﬀerence between the two discount
rates is independent of the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
This equation provides two arguments in favor of r2 ≤ r1. First, it is often
suggested that the growth rate of environmental quality is smaller than the
economic growth rate (g2 ≤ g1), the ﬁrst being potentially negative. Second,
it seems that there is much more uncertainty surrounding the evolution of the
environmental quality than the evolution of the economy itself (σ22 ≥ σ11).
If the degrees aversion to risk on x1 and on x2 are not too heterogeneous,
this would imply that γ2σ22−γ1σ11 be positive. Finally determining whether
(γ1 − γ2)σ12 is positive or negative is a more complex matter.
Because of the lack of time-series data about environmental quality, cali-
brating this speciﬁcation is problematic. Various authors have argued in fa-
vor of a closer link between the environmental quality and economic growth
than the one that we assumed in Proposition 1. Following this line, let us
alternatively assume that the environmental quality is a deterministic func-
tion of economic achievement: x2 = f(x1). Common wisdom suggests that
the environmental quality is a decreasing function of GDP per capita, but
this is heavily debated in scientiﬁc circles. The environmental Kuznets curve
hypothesizes that the relationship between per capita income and the envi-
ronmental quality has an inverted U-shape, but there is no consensus about
it (see for example Millimet, List and Stengos (2003)). We hereafter hypoth-
esize a monotone relationship by assuming that there exists ρ ∈ R such that
x2 = ηx
ρ
1,w h e r eρ can be either positive or negative. If we assume that x1
follows a geometric Brownian motion, we obtain an analytical solution for r1
and r2.




2 ,t h a tx2 = ηx
ρ
1 and
x1t follows a geometric Brownian motion. It implies that the ecological dis-
count rate equals
r2(t)=δ +( ργ2 + γ1 − 1)[g1 − 0.5(ργ2 + γ1)σ11], (11)
11where g1 = t−1 lnEx1t/x10 and σ11 = t−1Va r(x1t). Symmetrically, the eco-
n o m i cd i s c o u n tr a t ee q u a l s
r1(t)=δ +( γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))[g1 − 0.5(1 + γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))σ11]. (12)
We also get here ﬂat term structures of the socially eﬃcient discount
rates. In order to calibrate this model, let us assume that the rate of pure
preference for the present δ is zero. We also assume that the relative aversion
to risk on consumption is a constant γ1 =2 , which is often considered as a
reasonable estimation.4 The parameter γ2 of aversion to environmental risk




γ1 + γ2 − 2
is the share of total consumption expenditures that the representative agent
would use on environmental quality if environmental quality would be a trad-
able good.5 Hoel and Sterner (2007) and Sterner and Persson (2008) sug-
gested γ∗ somewhere 10% and 50%, which yields γ2 somewhere between 1.1
and 2 under our speciﬁcation. We hereafter assume γ∗ = 30%, which implies
γ2 =1 .4.
Kocherlakota (1996) estimated the parameters of the growth process of
consumption in the United States with yearly data between 1889 and 1978.
He obtained g1 =1 .8% and σ
1/2
11 =3 .6%. The choice of ρ depends upon how
we deﬁne the environmental quality. In order to estimate ρ,w ec o n s i d e r e d
the SYS LAN indicator contained in the Environmental Sustainability Index
(ESI2005, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, (2005)), which
measures for 146 countries in 2005 the percentage of total land area (including
inland waters) having very low or very high anthropogenic impact. The OLS
estimation of the regression coeﬃcients are as follows:
lnx2 =1 .93 − 0.10lnx1 + ε
where x1 is the country’s GDP/cap6 whereas x2 is 3 plus the country’s
SYS LAN indicator contained in ESI2005. The p-value for the slope-coeﬃcient
4See Dr` eze (1981) for example.
5Because the price elasticity equals −1 under this speciﬁcation, this share remains
constant over time.
6We used data from the World Economic Outlook Database of IMF, April 2008.
12is -4.69, whereas the R2 coeﬃcient equals 0.13. Plugging ρ = −0.10 in equa-
tions (11) and (12) yields r2 =1 .4% and r1 =3 .2%.7 The diﬀerence comes
mostly from the large expected economic growth rate (g1 =1 .8%) compared
to the expected environmental growth rate (g2 = ρg1 =0 .18%).
In the third speciﬁcation for the dynamics of (x1t,x 2t), we introduce some
parametric uncertainty. Conditional to parameter θ, x1t follows a geometric
Brownian motion with drift g1(θ) and volatility σ
1/2
11 (θ), whereas x2 = ηx
ρ(θ)
1 .
In this case, we obtain the following proposition.




2 ,t h a tx2 = ηx
ρ
1 and
x1t follows a geometric Brownian motion. Suppose that the true value of
triplet (g1,σ 11,ρ) is uncertain at date 0 so that it depends upon some pa-
rameter θ whose cumulative distribution function is F.I t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e







where R2(θ)=( ργ2 + γ1 − 1)[g1 − 0.5(ργ2 + γ1)σ11]. Symmetrically, the







where R1(θ)=( γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))[g1 − 0.5(1 + γ1 + ρ(γ2 − 1))σ11].
By Jensen inequality, this immediately implies that the term structures
of r1 and r2 are decreasing. The short-term discount rate ri(t)e q u a l sδ plus
the mean of Ri when t tends to zero, and it tends to δ plus the smallest
possible value of Ri(θ)w h e nt tends to inﬁnity. These results generalize
those obtained by Weitzman (2007) and Gollier (2007) to multiattribute
utility functions. They both assumed that the economic growth rate was
aﬀected by parametric uncertainty. Suppose alternatively that g1 and σ11 are
known, but the elasticity ρ of environmental quality to changes in GDP is
not. Rather than assuming that ρ = −0.1 as above, let us suppose that ρ
is either −0.6o r+ 0 .4 with equal probabilities. All other parameters remain
7This solution is only marginally sensitive to the choice of γ2. To illustrate, assuming
γ2 = 2 rather than 1.1w o u l dy i e l dr2 =1 .3% and r1 =3 .1%.











Figure 1: The term structures of the economic and ecological discount rates
(in %), assuming δ =0 ,γ=2 ,γ 2 =1 .4,g 1 =1 .8%, σ
1/2
11 =3 .6% and
ρ ∼ (−0.6,1/2;0.4,1/2).
unchanged. We draw the term structure of r1 and r2 in Figure 1. Whereas the
economic discount rate is almost independent of time horizon, the ecological
discount rate goes from 1.4% to 0.3% when t goes from 0 to inﬁnity. The
high uncertainty aﬀecting the long-term evolution of the environment in this
speciﬁcation explains why the term structure of the ecological discount rate
is decreasing.
5 Related literature
The Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation is the only one that yields an analytical
solution for the integrals in (2) and (4) under a realistic description of ex-
pectations about (x1t,x 2t) under uncertainty. Various authors have recently
examined the term structure of the ecological discount rate when the eco-
nomic growth rate is a constant g1, i.e. x1t = x10eg1t, and the environmental
quality is a constant x2. In that case, it is easy to check that equations (4)












These two equations immediately yield the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that consumption grows at a positive constant rate
and that the environmental quality is stable over time. Then,
1. (Gollier (2002)) the economic discount rate is decreasing (resp. increas-
ing) with the time horizon if the relative aversion to consumption risk
R11(x1,x 2)=−x1U11(x1,x 2)/U1(x1,x 2) is decreasing (resp. increas-
ing) with consumption.
2 . t h ee c o l o g i c a ld i s c o u n tr a t ei sd e c r e a s i n g( r e s p .i n c r e a s i n g )w i t ht h et i m e
horizon if the elasticity of the marginal utility of the environment with
respect to consumption, R21(x1,x 2)=−x1U21(x1,x 2)/U2(x1,x 2), is de-
creasing (resp. increasing) with consumption.
The intuition for property 1 is that, under R11 decreasing, the rate of
change of the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing in the degree of
economic development, thereby reducing the size of the wealth eﬀect. This
result parallels the one obtained by Gollier (2002) with only one good. A
parallel intuition holds for property 2: Under R21 decreasing, the rate of
change of the marginal utility of the environment is decreasing in the degree
of economic development, yielding a decreasing economic growth eﬀect.
Guesnerie (2004), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Sterner and Persson (2008)
and Traeger (2007) obtained special cases of the results in Proposition 4 by


















where σ>0 is the elasticity of substitution, α>0i sr e l a t i v ea v e r s i o n
towards the risk on ”aggregate good” y,a n dγ ∈ [0,1] is a preference weight





U tends to a Cobb-Douglas utility (7) with 1 − γ1 =( 1− α)(1 − γ)a n d





























Corollary 1 (Guesnerie (2004), Hoel and Sterner (2007), Traeger (2007))
Suppose that the growth rate of consumption is a positive constant g1,a n dt h a t
the environmental quality is stable. Suppose also that the utility function is
characterized by (15). The economic discount rate and the ecological discount
rate are decreasing (increasing) with the time horizon if (ασ − 1)(σ − 1) is
negative (positive).
When the elasticity of substitution σ tends to unity, the term structures
are ﬂat, which can be seen as a special case of Proposition 1.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Environmentalists are often quite skeptical about using standard cost-beneﬁt
analysis to shape environmental policies because environmental damages in-
curred in the distant future are claimed to receive insuﬃcient weights in the
economic evaluation. This may be due either because future environmental
assets are undervalued, or because the economic discount rate is too large.
In this paper, we address these two questions altogether by deﬁning an eco-
logical discount rate compatible with social welfare when the representative
agent cares about both the economic and ecological environment faced by
future generations. This ecological rate at which future environmental dam-
ages are discounted may be much smaller than the economic rate at which
economic damages are discounted, because of the integration of the poten-
tially increasing willingness to pay for the environment into the ecological
16discount rate. We have also shown in this paper that the uncertainties sur-
rounding the evolutions of the environment and the economy tend to reduce
the discount rates, in particular if they are positively correlated.
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19APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Under the speciﬁcation of this proposition, we can rewrite EU2(x1t,x 2t)
as
EU2(x1t,x 2t)=k(1 − γ2)E [expzt],
where zt =( 1− γ1)lnx1t − γ2 lnx2t is normally distributed with mean







2σ22 − 2(1 − γ1)γ2σ12
¢
t.
As is well-known, the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for an exponential
utility function with a normally distributed random variable. It implies that
EU2(x1t,x 2t)=k(1 − γ2)E [expzt]=k(1 − γ2)exp(Ezt +0 .5Va r(zt)).
This implies in turn that
EU2(x1t,x 2t)
U2(x10,x 20)
= exp((1 − γ1)g1 − γ2g2 +0 .5(γ1(γ1 − 1)σ11 + γ2(γ2 +1 ) σ22 − 2(1 − γ1)γ2σ12))t,
where gi is the expected growth rate of xit: Exit = xi0egit.8 Applying (4)
c o n c l u d e st h i sp r o o f .As y m m e t r i ca n a l y s i sc a nb em a d ef o rr1(t). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
We can rewrite U2(x1,x 2)=kη−γ2(1 − γ2)x
1−γ1−ργ2
1 , which implies that
EU2(x1t,x 2t) be proportional to E exp[(1 − γ1 − ργ2)lnx1t]. Again, since the
Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact for an exponential utility function with
a normally distributed random variable, we have that
EU2(x1t,x 2t)
U2(x10,x 20)
= exp((1 − γ1 − ργ2)(μ1t +0 .5(1 − γ1 − ργ2)σ11t), (17)
8Using Ito’s Lemma or the property that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact in
this framework yields that gi = μi +0 .5σii.
20with μ1 = t−1E ln(x1t/x10)=g1 −0.5σ11. Applying (4) concludes this proof.




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3







Applying (4) concludes this proof. ¥
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